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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Gary Louis Coe appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault and use of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
According to the presentence report ("PSI"), the facts underlying Coe's
convictions for aggravated assault and exhibition of a deadly weapon are as follows:
Shortly after 9:30 p.m. on November 15, 2010, Post Falls Police
responded to the "Falls Club" following report that the business owner had
taken a .357 revolver (containing 5-live and one spent/fired rounds of
ammunition) away from patron/defendant Coe (age 67) who had since left
the tavern with his wife) [sic]. The owner told police that defendant had
argued with a patron (victim Phil Pellerin/age 49), followed by the two men
exiting the premise to the parking lot - victim the follower. The tavern
owner also exited moments later to observe defendant standing in the
parking lot aiming his handgun at the victim, at which time he lunged at
defendant to divert its use and the gun discharged into the air. The victim
was interviewed, and generally corroborated information told police by the
business owner.
The victim admitted to a brief verbal argument,
challenging defendant to go outside to 'settle it', and then doing so (not in
fear of the elder-aged defendant). Police then travelled to defendant's
residence and interviewed him.
Defendant reported the argument
concerned the victim and another patron 'hitting on' his niece who was
present at the bar, and when challenged by the victim he exited to his
truck to retrieve his handgun. He reported pointing it (to be "prepared")
when the victim reached toward his (coat) pocket. When police asked
defendant why he did not just leave in his truck to avoid the confrontation,
he told police he had been "challenged" - had "stepped up to the
situation" hoping to be "quicker on the draw" (if needed) - using the
weapon to instill fear (not necessarily intent on using it) as a means to end
to [sic] the confrontation/circumstance.
(PSI, p.2.)

1

The state charged Coe with aggravated assault and with using a deadly weapon
during the commission of that offense. (R., pp.41-42.) At trial, a jury convicted Coe of
aggravated assault and found that he committed the offense with a deadly weapon. (R.,
pp.129-130.) The district court sentenced Coe to a unified term of ten years with two
years fixed, and suspended that sentence and placed Coe on probation for two years.
(R., pp.140-145.) Coe filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.146-149.)
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ISSUES
Coe states the issues on appeal as:
A.

Was Mr. Coe harmed by the District Court's error in refusing to
allow Mr. Coe to present evidence of his reputation for being kind,
caring and generous?

B.

Was Mr. Coe harmed by the District Court's error in refusing to
instruct the jury as requested by Mr. Coe?

C.

Did the combination of errors and irregularities deprive Mr. Coe of
his due process right to a fair trial?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The State rephrases the issue as:
1. Has Coe failed to show the district court erred by excluding, under I.R.E. 404(a),
evidence that he is kind, caring, and generous?
2. Has Coe failed to show error in the jury instructions?
3. Has Coe failed to demonstrate cumulative error?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Coe Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Excluding, Under I.R.E. 404(a),
Evidence That He Is Kind, Caring, And Generous

A.

Introduction
Coe contends the district court abused its discretion in excluding his proposed

character witnesses from testifying. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-7.) Coe's argument fails,
however, because the district court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that
the proposed testimony that Coe is a kind, caring, and generous person was not
relevant to the elements of aggravated assault and exhibition of a deadly weapon.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence

and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only when there has been
a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 721, 24 P.3d 44, 48
(2001);Statev. Robinett, 141 ldaho110, 112, 106P.3d436,438(2005).

C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Excluding Coe's Proposed
Character Testimony, Under I.R.E. 404(a). That He Is Kind, Caring, And
Generous
Character evidence ordinarily is inadmissible for the purpose of showing that an

individual acted in conformity therewith on any particular occasion. I.R.E. 404(a); State
v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 19, 794 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Harvey, 142
Idaho 527, 533, 129 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006).

A criminal defendant may,

however, offer evidence of a pertinent character trait, provided the prosecution is
afforded an opportunity to rebut the same. I.R.E. 404(a)(1);
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.fu!QQ, 118 Idaho at 19, 794

P.2d at 289. For example, one charged with theft may offer evidence of honesty. State
v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941, 942, 792 P.2d 966, 967 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. Kramp.
200 Mont. 383, 651 P.2d 614, 618 (1982). In Bailey, the Idaho Court of Appeals held
that evidence that Bailey only drank alcohol in moderation was not relevant to the
elements of his DUI charge because a person need not drink excessively to be
convicted of DUI, he only needs only to be shown to have consumed alcohol which
perceptibly impaired his ability to drive. Bailey, 117 Idaho at 943, 792 P.2d at 968. In
the more recent case of State v. Rothwell, 2012 WL 53731 (Idaho App. 2012), the Idaho
Court of Appeals held that, in Rothwell's trial for lewd and lascivious conduct, the district
court erred (harmlessly) by excluding opinion or reputation testimony that Rothwell was
"trustworthy with preteen children," following the majority rule of other states that "traits
relating to a defendant's sexual morality with children are pertinent" to cases involving
sexual misconduct with a child, id., at *3.
In short, pertinent trait evidence under I.R.E. 404(a) cannot be admitted unless it
is relevant to the elements of the crime charged. Bailey, 117 Idaho at 942, 792 P.2d at
967. Evidence is relevant if it increases the likelihood that a fact at issue did or did not
occur. I.R.E. 401. In this case, after Coe's attorney asked Todd Bartlett "what kind of
person [Coe] is," the prosecutor objected and Coe's counsel made an offer of proof
outside the jury's presence, followed by a discussion between both counsel and the
court, to wit:
THE COURT: ... What particular character trait is going to be offered by
this witness?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would expect he and other
witnesses would offer the character traits of [Coe] as a generous, kind,
giving person. . . . Just that he is a good person, a kind person, a giving
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person, a caring person - I'm sorry. I'm getting a whisper here - and a
nonviolent person.
THE COURT: How would character for kind [sic] - or for giving and caring
be relevant?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Those are nice, peaceful character traits. I think
I can put his character in issue under 404(a)(1 ).
THE COURT: Any response from the state?
[PROSECUTOR]: I think the only one that might be admissible, your
Honor, is his character for violence or not violence. I think that's it.
THE COURT:
I agree for [sic] character trait for peacefulness is
admissible. Character for kind, giving, and caring is not relevant and is
not admissible. And general goodness is not admissible, but character
trait for peacefulness is admissible.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I will the need to be able to ask the
witnesses a more leading type of question to direct them to that answer.
THE COURT: Sure.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All my witnesses have lots of really good stories
to say about [Coe] and I don't want to run afoul with the Court's ruling.
THE COURT: Sure. The Court exercises its discretion in ruling, so
because the language of 404(a)(1) is evidence of a pertinent trait, and the
Court finds the pertinent trait in this issue to be whether the defendant is
peaceful or not.
(Tr., p.101, Ls.11-14; p.103, L.17-p.105, L.3.)
Application of the standards of relevance under I.R.E. 404(a) and 401 shows no
error by the district court. Although the qualities of being kind, caring, and generous
may overlap in differing ways what it means to be peaceful, it is the only trait of
"peacefulness" that refutes the elements of aggravated assault - which is based on
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threatening to do violence. 1

Conversely, to the extent the terms "kind, caring, and

generous" differ in meaning from "peacefulness," they are not relevant to the crimes
Coe committed.
Inasmuch as the district court permitted Coe to introduce testimony that he is a
peaceful person (see Tr., p.105, Ls.20-23) - the only trait that is pertinent to aggravated
assault -- the court did not err in refusing Coe's request to also show he is kind, caring
and generous.

Coe has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in

excluding his proposed character evidence.

1

Jury Instruction No. 11 set out the elements necessary to prove Coe committed
aggravated assault as:
1. On or about 15th [sic] day of November, 201 O;
2. in the state of Idaho;
3. the defendant GARY LOUIS COE committed an assault on Phil
Pellerin;
4. the defendant committed that assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument.
(R., p.115 (emphasis original).) In Jury Instruction No. 12, the jury was next instructed:

An "assault" is committed when a person;
Intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to the
person of another, with the apparent ability to do so, and does some act
which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is
imminent.
(R., p.116 (emphasis added).)
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D.

Even If The District Court Erred In Excluding The Testimony, Such Error
Harmless

Was

'"Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless error] is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201,
1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct.
App. 1991 )). The district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the opinion
or reputation testimony that Coe was kind, caring, and generous. However, even if the
court erred, the exclusion of such testimony was harmless because there is no
reasonable probability that the error contributed to the jury's verdict. For the reasons
discussed above, the proposed character testimony had, at best, minimal relevance to
the elements of aggravated assault. The jury was already informed by Todd Bartlett
that Coe is a very peaceful person.

Adding that Coe was also "kind, caring and

generous" would not have impacted the jury any more than being told he was peaceful,
considering the charge Coe faced was based on a lack of peacefulness. There is no
reasonable possibility that the lack of such testimony might have contributed to the
conviction.
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II.
Coe Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury Instructions

A.

Introduction
Coe argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury as to the

elements on which it could find him guilty of aggravated assault.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.7-10.) Coe claims on appeal, as he did during trial, that by separately instructing the
jury on the elements of aggravated assault and the definition of "assault," the jury could
have become confused and convicted him without finding the victim had a well-founded
fear that the violence Coe threatened was imminent.

(Appellant's Brief, p.8; see

Amended Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.14; Jury Instructions Nos. 11 and 12, fn. 1, supra.)
Coe's claim on appeal fails.
Contrary to Coe's argument, the instructions as given were not confusing and did
not, as he claims, confuse the jury or lessen the state's burden of proof.

The jury

instructions, as a whole, correctly stated the law and did not mislead the jury. Coe has
failed to show that the instructions were in any way erroneous, and has also failed to
show that the error he claims so distorted the trial as to result in a violation of his due
process rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654
(2000)).

"An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the

instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Shackelford, 150
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Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459,
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole because "[i]t
is well established that [an] instruction 'may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must
be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record." Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147
(1973)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Instructed The Jury On The Elements Of Aggravated
Assault
It is not reversible error to instruct a jury on the elements of a crime by providing

the statutory language related to that crime.

Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 518

P.2d 1190 (1974); LaRue v. Archer, 130 Idaho 267, 271, 939 P.2d 586, 590 (Ct. App.
1997).

The elements of aggravated assault (as applicable to this case) are (1) an

intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another,
coupled with (a) an apparent ability to do so, and (b) doing some act which creates a
well-founded fear in such person that such violence is imminent, and (2) committing the
foregoing with a deadly weapon or instrument. I.C. §§ 18-901 (b), 18-905(a); see also
State v. Cudd, 137 Idaho 625, 627, 51 P.3d 439 (Ct. App. 2002). The district court
instructed the jury accordingly.
Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, read together, properly instructed the jury as to
the elements of aggravated assault. (R., pp.115-116.) Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 are
simply Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 1201 (defining assault) and 1205 (aggravated
assault), with the addition of information from the current case. Although Coe appears
to concede that the jury instructions were correct, he contends that separating the
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definition of assault (Instr. No. 12) from the elements instruction (Instr. No. 11) could
have caused the jury to become confused by having "to refer elsewhere for that
definition." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Coe provides no specific authority to support his
argument that having a jury refer to another instruction for a definition of a term in an
elements instruction presents any problem, or would confuse a jury. (See Appellant's
Brief, pp.7-10.) To the contrary, because the district court instructed the jury in this
case on the elements of assault and aggravated assault by using the statutory
language, and did so in immediate sequence, Coe's claim of error is without merit.
The district court rejected Coe's argument, explaining:
The Court has exercised its discretion in giving what is now jury instruction
No. 11 and rejecting defendant's proposed No. 7 for a couple of reasons,
one of which is it is the recommended - the one that the Court's giving is
the recommended Supreme Court-approved instruction on aggravated
assault. And the Court tried to address counsel's concern by making the
definition of assault, which includes the language of the fear and the wellfounded fear, as instruction No. 12 so that it follows immediately after No.
11. So essentially, 11 gives the elements of aggravated assault as being
the date and the state and the defendant committing an assault. And then
with a deadly weapon, No. 12 then defines assault including the fear.
(Amended Tr., p.13, L.18-p.14, L.6.)
As the district court concluded, the jury instructions, as a whole, properly
instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault. See Shackelford, 150 Idaho
at 373-74, 247 P.3d at 600-601; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The jury was appropriately
instructed that it must "consider [the instructions] as a whole, not picking out one and
disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance
as to their relative importance." (R., p.105 (Instr. No. 3).) It is presumed that the jury
followed those instructions. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 802, 932 P.2d 907, 925 (Ct.
App. 1997) ("It is presumed that the jury follows the instructions of the trial court."). Coe
11

has failed to show error because, as the district court determined, the instructions did in
fact require the jury to find "the language of the fear and the well-founded fear" found in
Instruction No. 12, and the jury is presumed to have followed those instructions.
(Amended Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.2)
In sum, the instruction defining assault, together with the elements instruction for
aggravated assault, required the jury to find that the state had proven Coe's threatened
violence created "a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is
imminent." (R., p.116.) Coe's claim of error is thus without merit.

111.
Coe Has Failed To Demonstrate Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of
the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131
Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Coe has failed to show any error, much less
two or more errors. Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case.
See,~. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Coe's convictions for
aggravated assault and exhibition of a deadly weapon.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of February, 2013, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ROBYN FYFFE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
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. cKinney
Attorney General
JCM/pm
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